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RECENT CASES

in the use of class actions which would parallel California's progressive model. Restrictive approaches in states such as New York
fail to recognize the substantial public benefit which can accrue
by a more liberal application of the class action to consumer fraud
situations. Where joinder of parties is impracticable a court's refusal to allow prosecution of claims by class suit may, practically
speaking, leave the injured consumer without legal recourse. But
as one observer has recently noted, when "[f]aced with the choice
of letting wrongdoers retain the fruits of illegal conduct or
venturing into problem areas of class litigation, the [Field Code]
courts all too often have chosen the former alternative.""' The
state of commercial affairs demands that the courts of New York
and similar jurisdictions abandon the strict adherence to decisional
precedent which denies class actions when "separate wrongs to
separate persons" are involved. If common interest among class
members must be found, the Vasquez opinion offers a more reasonable and equitable standard in recognition of the obvious similarity in questions of law and fact among injured consumers.

Only through acknowledgment of consumers' rights will the norm
of responsibility in the giant retailing and advertising industries
be significantly improved.
DAVID A. SANDS

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-CONvERSION

OF

FINE

INTO

TERM OF IMPRISONMENT FOR OFFENDERS FINANCIALLY UNABLE

To

PAY FINE HELD VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Preston Tate, an indigent, was convicted of various traffic

offenses which were punishable by fine only. Accordingly, he was
fined a total of $425. Since he was unable to pay the fine, Texas
law required that he be imprisoned for a period of time sufficient
to "serve-out" his fine at the rate of $5 per day. Thus Tate was
sent to prison and after serving 21 days he applied for a writ of
habeas corpus, alleging that he was unable to pay the fine due to
his indigency. The County Criminal Court of Harris County denied the writ and the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed,
rejecting the appellant-petitioner's contention that his impri81.

Homburger, supra note 11, at 617.
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sonment was unconstitutional because he was too poor to pay
the fine.' Tate appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and
in a unanimous decision the Court held that where a state
has declared that for a given offense its penological interest is
served by a fine alone, it is a denial of equal protection to convert
such a fine into a prison sentence for those who are financially
unable to pay. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
The concept of imprisonment for persons unable or unwilling to pay a court-imposed fine or penalty has long been
established in the Anglo-American judicial system. Practically,
the concept has been embodied in two different sentencing procedures: fine collection and alternative punishment, that is, "thirty days or thirty dollars." 3
While these practices flourished unchallenged with regard
to the sentencing of indigents, decisions in other, analogous areas
of criminal procedure began to recognize the special problems of
providing justice for the poor. In Griffin v. Illinois,4 the
Supreme Court declared that financial disparity among criminal
defendants should not affect the kind of justice they receive; while
Douglas v. California5 stood for the proposition that the state has
an affirmative duty to assure that the poor man receives, at least,
an approximation of equal justice. These cases, however, were
thought not to apply to equality in punishment between rich
and poor, but only to equality in access to justice prior to conviction. Punishment was to remain a highly individualized matter,
where the sentencing judge retained a great deal of discretion.
Since no offender had the right to demand that he be punished
in exactly the same manner as another who had committed an
identical offense, the poor offender could not maintain that his
imprisonment, as opposed to the rich man's money-loss for the
same offense, was unfair.6 However, while a handful of rela1. Ex parte Tate, 445 S.W.2d 210 (rex. Crim. App. 1969).
2. Comment, Fines, Imprisonment, and the Poor: "Thirty Dollars or Thirty
Days," 57 CALIF. L. l~v. 778, 783-87 (1969).
3. Id. at 791-95.
4. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
5. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
6. In United States ex rel. Privitera v. Kross, 239 F. Supp. 118, 120 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd mem., 345 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 US. 911 (1965), it was said that
an indigent defendant:
has no constitutional right that another defendant, no matter what his economic
status, rich or poor, receive the same sentence for the same offense . . . . No
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tively recent cases began to point out the unfairness of punishment being dependent upon economic status, 7 there was a great
reluctance to conclusively abolish the practice, despite practical
as well as legal reasons for doing so.8
A major step was taken when the United States Supreme
Court was recently confronted with the constitutional problem
of imprisonment of indigents for nonpayment of fines in
Williams v. Illinois.9 Willie E. Williams was convicted of petty
theft and received the maximum statutory sentence, one year
in prison as well as a five-hundred dollar fine and five dollars
court costs. 10 The judgment provided that, if the prisoner was
in default of the fine after his one-year incarceration, he should
remain in jail to "work off" this obligation at a rate of five
dollars per day, all in accordance with section 1-7 (k) of the
Illinois Criminal Code. 1 The prisoner petitioned the trial court
to vacate that portion of judgment which called for further incarceration in lieu of the payment of his fine.' 2 The trial court
granted the state's motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds
that claim was premature as Williams was still serving the
authorized one year imprisonment, not the additional time. 3 On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois bypassed the ripeness issue
and chose to hear the case on the merits, but found no denial of
equal protection. 4 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and held that "when the aggregate imprisonment
exceeds the maximum period fixed by statute and results directly from an involuntary nonpayment of a fine or court costs...
[there] is an impermissible discrimination that rests on ability
to pay"' 5 and therefore a violation of the equal protection
different conclusion is required by the line of cases beginning with Griffin v.
People of the State of Illinois [351 U.S. 12 (1956)]. Those decisions making review of criminal convictions available to the indigent have not yet been construed
to compel government, state or federal, to eradicate from the administration of
criminal justice every disadvantage caused by indigence.
7. See, e.g., Sawyer v. District of Columbia, 238 A.2d 314 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968);
People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1966); People v.
Collins, 47 Misc. 2d 210, 261 N.Y.S.2d 970 (Orange County Ct. 1965).
8. See Comment, supra note 2, at 785-810.

9. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
10. Id. at 236.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 237.
13. Id.
14. People v. Williams, 41 111. 2d 511, 517, 244 N.E.2d 197, 200 (1969).
15. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1970) (emphasis added).
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clause. The essential consideration in Williams seemed to be that
when the state has fixed the "outer limits of incarceration necessary to satisfy its penological interest,"' 6 it may not subject
indigent defendants to a period of imprisonment beyond those
limits. What powers the state may have within those limits must
have been deemed a separate question, one not within the reach
of the Court in the Williams fact situation. The majority opinion
also specifically asserted that the judgment did not deal with
the "familiar pattern of alternative sentence of '$30 or 30 days.' "17
The companion case to Williams, Morris v. Schoonfield, s
was remanded to the District Court of Maryland due to intervening corrective legislation by that state. Here, there was no
question of exceeding the outer limits of incarceration as was
presented in Williams. Four Justices although concurring in the
remand, felt that it was then appropriate to state their views
on the practice of imprisoning indigents for nonpayment of fines.
The concurring opinion by Mr. Justice White speaking for those
four Justices asserted that:
[T]he same constitutional defect condemned in Williams also inheres in jailing an indigent for failing to make immediate payment of any fine, whether or not the fine is accompanied by a jail
term and whether or not the jail term of the indigent extends
beyond the maximum term imposed on a person willing and able
to pay a fine. In each case, the Constitution prohibits the State
from imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.19
The opinion, however, acknowledged that the decision in
Williams would not prevent states from establishing an "equivalent" jail sentence, which the indigent may serve after the state
has attempted some sort of accommodation.2 0 These four Justices, then, were most concerned over summary, immediate and/or
16.
17.

Id. at 242.
Id. at 243.

18. 399 U.S. 508 (1970) (per curiam).
19. Id. at 509 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Mr. Justice Harlan
in an unnumbered footnote to his Williams concurrence, also expressed the vicw that
the breach of maximum statutory limits had no bearing on this issue. 399 U.S. at 265.
20. Id. at 509.
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automatic conversion of a fine into a jail term. They interpreted
the minimal meaning of Williams thusly:
[I]n imposing fines as punishment for criminal conduct more
care must be taken to provide for those whose lack of funds
21
would otherwise automatically convert a fine into jail sentence.
This, then, indicated a reluctance to summarily ban the fine-imprisonment alternative for indigents. Mr. Justice White's opinion did indicate, though, that alternative punishment provisions should be subjected to close judicial scrutiny when applied to indigents, and should provide for an attempt at accomodation prior to imprisonment. Most state statutes providing for
imprisonment of indigents in default of payment could not
be construed as providing for any attempt at accommodation and thus would not survive this test. Certainly, the many
states which provide for release from jail upon a showing of indigency by the prisoner would not meet Justice White's require2
ment of an attempt at accommodation prior to the imprisonment.
A recent California case, In re Antazo,23 squarely confronted
the issue of incarceration of indigents in lieu of payment. Simeon
Antazo entered a plea of guilty to a charge of arson. At arraignment for sentencing the California trial court placed Antazo
on probation on condition that he pay a fine of $2,500
and a penalty assessment of $625 or "in lieu of payment
24
. ..one (1) day in the County Jail for each $10.00 unpaid."
He was unable to pay and immediately began to "serve out" his
fine in jail. The Supreme Court of California, after establishing
that a habeas corpus proceeding was proper in this case, held
that the confinement of an indigent to serve out a fine and
penalty at a specified rate per day is an invidious discrimination
in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 25 In this case, like Morris, there was no question of imprisonment beyond a statutory maximum as in Williams. The
California Supreme Court, nevertheless, freely cited Williams in
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. Two states that provide for accommodation prior to incarceration are New
Jersey and Wisconsin. However, both states make the prior accommodation discretionary
for the sentencing judge. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:166-15 (1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 973.05

(1971).
23.
24.
25.

3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970).
Id. at 106, 473 P.2d at 1002, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
Id. at 115, 473 P.2d at 1009, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
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its opinion, evidently feeling that the breach of the outer limits of
incarceration was not a vital component in the Williams rationale.
The court's use of the equal protection rationale in the same manner as in Williams indicated that this rationale does not require
the imprisonment to be in excess of statutory limits to be declared impermissible.
The relatively short majority opinion in the Tate case adopts,
without extensive explanation, the equal protection rationale
used in Williams and Morris. The Court has become comfortable
enough with that rationale to merely mention that a violation
of equal protection has occurred. 26 The instant case fits squarely
into that rationale as it has been developed. Broadly speaking the
"new" equal protection rationale prohibits a state from unduly
burdening any classification or group of persons when the classification is based on "suspect criteria," and it further prohibits
the abrogation of an individual's fundamental rights, unless, in
either case, the state can show a compelling interest for so
acting.27 In the case under discussion, we have both a classi26. Mr. Justice Harlan views this development with dismay. He has consistently
admonished his brethren concerning the use of the new equal protection rationale in
cases other than those involving racial discrimination. See, e.g., his dissents in Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 29 (1956) and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969). He
advocates a return to the standard of due process of law and the elimination of the
classifications and comparative approaches of the equal protection rationale. The logical
extension of the equal protection approach, in Justice Harlan's view, would result in
a requirement that government take affirmative action to redress differences in the condition of persons subject to its laws, wherever those laws apply with varying effect or
harshness due to such differences in condition. Thus graduated tuition at state universities might be required. The answer to Justice Harlan's objection and a weakness of the
equal protection rationale probably stem from the identical problem-equal protection in
this area is a misnomer. What is really being offered is a minimum protection of "just
wants" as is suggested by Professor Michelman. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting
the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. Rxv. 7 (1969). The
comparisons used in the various equal protection cases, merely point out how "just" the

particular "want" is.
27. This test evolved over a period of time in a number of cases involving

various rights and groups of persons. The following is a list of some of these cases

indicating the burdened group or suspect classification and the right infringed upon

in each case. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (the poor; right to
travel among the states); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimate children;
right to recover for wrongful death of mother); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966) (the poor; right to vote); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963) and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (the poor; right to appeal criminal
convictions or ultimately the right to personal liberty); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942) (certain habitual criminals; right to procreate). The test was described by
Chief Justice Earl Warren in a case where it was not found applicable, McDonald v.
Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969). The test is ultimately a balancing
test. Some of the rights abrogated are so "fundamental" that even the +most compelling
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fication based on suspect criteria-the poor; and a denial of an
individual's fundamental right to liberty-the incarceration which
,occurs only because he is poor. The state does-have a legitimate interest in collecting fines, but the alternatives available, such as
installment payments, are arguably more effective and less burdensome upon the offender. In fact, it has been often correctly
stated that imprisonment to "work-off" a fine at a per diem rate
does not further the state's interest in collecting that fine at all;
for the state then not only loses the revenue it may have received
from the fine, but it -also incurs the cost of supporting -the
indigent in jail 2 8
Many different alternative procedures have been proposed,
and many are presently available to sentencing judges. Among
these procedures are installment payments, delayed payments and
reduced payments. Also suggested is proportional payment,
modeled perhaps on the successful day-fine systems used'in Sweden
and Finland, where the amount of the fine is determined in proportion to the offender's ability to pay as well as the gravity of
his offense.2 9
Mr. Justice Blackmun, concurring, in both the opinion
and the result in the instant case, adds 'that the decision might
result in the substitution of jail terms for fines for many traffic
offenses, which certainly would be a far greater deterrent to unsafe driving and its resultant carnage.30 The writer agrees that
diminishing the horrifying losses that occur on our highways
would be a truly gratifying result, but the imprisonment sanction
presents certain dangers. It -would serve to introduce persons
who would never, in all probability, otherwise be incarcerated
to our "spawning grounds" of crime. Prison terms tend to embitter rather than rehabilitate and short terms, as are iontem31
plated here, are said to be. of the very least penological utility.

government interests are not enough to dislodge them. Other rights are not so vital,
but if they are being systematically denied to a given group of persons, the practice
may still violate the "classification [of persons] based on suspect criteria" branch of the
equal protection doctrine.
28. See sources cited in Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 400 n.5 (1971). See also Comment, supra note 2.
29. See Comment, supra note 2, at 817.
80. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 401 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring) [hereinafter cited as instant case].
31. See, e.g., Comment, supra iote 2, at 791-95; Note, 101 U. PA. L. R1v. 1013,
1021-24 (195).
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The possibility of mixing traffic offenders with hardened criminals is not an encouraging prospect. Most likely the proper approach to curtailing driving offenses rests in harsher license
revocation and suspension procedures. It must be remembered
that the detrimental effects of imprisonment are a prime reason for abolition of imprisonment in lieu of fine payment.
The primary question raised by the instant case is, how
does the statutorily-proscribed thirty days or thirty dollars alternative fare under the rationale of this decision. In Williams, as
previously mentioned, a limitation was enunciated whereby the
imprisonment levied because of nonpayment must have been
in excess of the maximum statutory limit for that offense in
order to be found unconstitutional. The Court, in the instant
case, by pointing out that the legislature had instituted a "fines
only" policy and had thus established a statutory limit that
could not be breached, seems to be reluctant to conclusively repudiate this part of the Williams rationale. 2 Under the thirty days
or thirty dollars alternative, the statutory limit of thirty days
is not breached when the indigent defendant must take thirty days
because he does not have the thirty dollars. (This indicates that
the thirty-thirty alternative might be retained under this rationale
or, at least, that it raises a separate question.) On the other hand,
however, the portion of the Morris opinion quoted in the instant
case might well indicate that the breach of statutory limits factor
3
is no longer controlling.
Mr. Justice Harlan, in his Williams concurrence, carefully
distinguished the thirty-thirty alternative from the WilliamsTate imprisonment for nonpayment situation. 4 According to
Harlan, the factor that distinguishes the latter situation and
makes it unconstitutional when applied to indigents is that the
legislature has declared that a fine alone will satisfy its penological
interests. 5 But, if the legislature authorizes a penalty of the
thirty-thirty type, can it not be said that here also they have declared their penal interest may be satisfied by a fine alone? Certainly the legislature would not be concerned if every time the
32.
33.
paper in
34.
35.

Instant case at 399.
The portion of the Morris opinion quoted in Tate is reproduced in this
the text accompanying supra note 20.
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 266 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id.
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offense were committed a fine were paid no imprisonment given.
And in nearly all cases, where a choice is given, except where the
defendant is financially unable, the fine will be paid. Where the
defendant has the financial wherewithal to pay his fine, the prison
alternative is so unlikely as to be functionally nonexistent.
The most relevant question to be asked about the thirty
days or thirty dollars situation is simply, does the identical evil
inhere in that situation as existed in Williams and in the instant
case. The evil in both of those cases as the Court stated in the
instant case was that the offender "was subjected to imprisonment solely because of his indigency. ' 3' This certainly occurs
when a man cannot pay a fine of thirty dollars and thus must
take the "alternative" of thirty days in jail, and it occurs regardless of the absence of a breach of any statutory ceiling.
Another question raised by the instant decision is whether
a law such as section 420.10 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law 37 will be subject to consititutional attack. This section
provides that, if a judge decides upon a fine for a given offense
and the offender is unable to pay the fine, the offender may apply
for resentencing, at which time the judge's options include any
sentence he could have given the prisoner at the original sentencing, which will for many offenses include imprisonment. This statute will be defended on the ground that the judge
must retain a broad range of options in punishment to fit the circumstances of various cases and defendants, but the basic evil
36. Instant case at 898.
37. N.Y. CRIMMAL PROcEDuRE LAiw § 420.10 subd. 4 (McKinney 1971) reads as
follows:
Application for resentence. In any case where the defendant is unable to pay a
fine imposed by the court, he may at any time apply to the court for resentence.
In such case, if the court is satisfied that the defendant is unable to pay the fine
it must:
(a) Adjust the terms of payment; or
(b) Lower the amount of the fine; or
(c) Where the sentence consists of probation or imprisonment and a
fine, revoke the portion of the sentence imposing the fine; or
(d) Revoke the entire sentence imposed and resentence the defendant.
Upon such resentence the court may impose any sentence it originally could have imposed, except that the amount of any fine imposed may not be in excess of the amount the defendant is able
to pay. (emphasis added)
Taken out of context as it is here, the word "may" referring to the offender's right
to apply for resentencing is somewhat misleading. He "may" apply, if he does not want to
go to jail under subdivision 2 of the same section, which sanctions imprisonment for
nonpayment of fines, subject only to the limitations set out in subdivision 4, above.
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remains: the indigent will go to jail, while the rich man may
buy his freedom. This seems especially unfair here, where the
judge has already declared that in a particular case the state's
interest could have been satisfied by a fine alone. Another related
and basic issue is whether the sentencing judge, with his
wide range of remedies for a given offense-including fines
and terms of imprisonment-should be allowed to imprison a
defendant solely because he knows or suspects the defendant will
not be able to pay a fine. If the defendant's record and the circumstances of the commission of the crime indicate that only
a fine is required, then a sentence of imprisonment, due to the
defendant's indigency, contains the same vice of discriminatory
treatment that has been condemned in the instant case, Morris
and Williams.
RICHARD L.

WOLL

TAXATION-TREASURY REGULATION VALUING MUTUAL
FUND SHARES FOR ESTATE TAX PURPOSES AT THE REPLACEMENT
COST HELD INVALID

As the executor of decedent's estate, plaintiff commenced
an action in the United States District Court for the Western
District of New York to recover $3,092.59 in estate taxes and
interest paid on shares held by the decedent at the time of her
death in an open-end investment company (mutual fund)." The
decedent had acquired the shares over a period of years through
gift, inheritance, and reinvestment of capital gains and ordinary
income distributions. The Commissioner had valued the shares
for estate tax purposes at their asked price, that is, the price at
which these shares could be purchased from the mutual fund at
the time of decedent's death.2 Plaintiff contended that the true
value of the shares was reflected in the bid price for such shares,
1. An estate tax is imposed by the INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2001 as follows:
A tax ... is hereby imposed on the transfer of the taxable estate ... of every
decedent, citizen or resident of the United States .... (emphasis added).
2. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8 (b) (1958), T.D. 6680, 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 417, 419 which
provides as follows:
-Valuation of shares in an open-end investment company. (1) The fair market
value of a share in an open-end investment company (commonly known as a
"mutual fund") is the public offering price of a share ....
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